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The Issue 
The regulation of Canada’s organic industry has been discussed for over a decade. Under 
the current voluntary system, organic producers and handlers are not required to obtain 
organic  certification.  Certifiers,  in  turn,  are  not  required  to  obtain  accreditation  to 
Canada’s voluntary national organic standard. Participation in Canada’s national standard 
is low because certifiers feel that accreditation to the standard is too costly and does not 
provide  access  for  their  clients  to  foreign  markets.  At  the  same  time,  the  federal 
government is having difficulty establishing equivalency agreements to enhance market 
access for Canadian organic products because participation in the national standard is low.   
This  Catch-22  situation  has  meant  that  there  is  no  minimum  Canadian  organic 
standard in place. The resultant proliferation of multiple regional certification standards 
results  in  high  transaction  costs  for  buyers  and  sellers  of  organic  products  (in  both 
domestic  and  foreign  markets),  who  must  verify  organic  authenticity  by  evaluating 
regional standards on a case-by-case basis. Using a transaction cost framework, this paper 
examines  the  implications  of  regulating  the  Canadian  organic  industry  through  the 
creation of a mandatory minimum organic standard.  
Implications and Conclusions 
Regulation  of  the  Canadian  organic  industry  could  have  several  benefits  for  industry 
participants  in  Canada  and  abroad.  Mandatory  participation  of  certifiers  in  Canada’s 
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national standard would bolster the federal government’s ability to pursue equivalency 
agreements  with  Canada’s  trading  partners,  which  would  reduce  transaction  costs  for 
buyers  and  sellers  in  domestic  and  foreign  markets.  A  legally  enforceable  minimum 
standard would also make it difficult for sellers of non-organic products to misrepresent 
their products as organic in an effort to obtain price premiums currently earned by most 
organic products. Segregation costs could be reduced, as it would no longer be necessary 
to keep products with different certification status separate as they move along the supply 
chain.  Finally,  accreditation  costs  for  certifiers  could  be  reduced  because  equivalency 
agreements between Canada and her trading partners would mean that accreditation to 
Canada’s  national  standard  would  provide  access  to  foreign  markets  for  Canadian 
exporters.  This  would  make  additional  international  accreditations,  currently  held  by 
Canadian certifiers, redundant and therefore unnecessary. 
Background  
Introduction and Definitions 
Transaction  costs  are  costs  associated  with  activities  carried  out  in  preparation  for 
(ex ante costs) and after an exchange (ex post costs) (Williamson, 1979). It is the goal of 
buyers and sellers in an exchange to minimize transaction costs. Ex ante costs include the 
costs of searching for an exchange, as well as negotiating, drafting, and safeguarding an 
agreement that specifies the terms of exchange. Ex post costs are costs associated with 
monitoring and enforcing the terms of an agreed-upon exchange.   
In the organic industry, transaction costs are primarily ex ante search costs associated 
with verifying organic authenticity. Consumers of organic products may be willing to pay 
a premium for products they believe to be “organic.” Uncertainty over product quality, 
however,  can  reduce  buyers’  willingness  to  pay  (Akerlof,  1970).  This  uncertainty  is 
increased  by  the  “credence”
1  quality  of  organic  products,  which  means  that  organic 
authenticity  cannot  be  verified  easily  (or  cheaply)  through  physical  inspection  or 
consumption after an exchange. Thus there is an incentive to signal quality to consumers 
through ex ante quality verification. In the organic industry, certification and accreditation 
systems have evolved to achieve this verification. 
Certification is the process by which a third party (a certification body) verifies that 
commodities  moving  along  the  supply  chain  are  produced,  stored,  transported,  and 
processed  according  to  principles  outlined  in  an  organic  standard.  As  it  pertains  to 
transaction  costs,  the  certification  process  means  that,  provided  a  buyer  of  organic 
products recognizes and accepts a certifier’s standards, the buyer does not have to incur 
costs associated with verification.  
Accreditation is the process by which buyers ensure that certifiers’ standards are at a 
minimum acceptable level. Where a diversity of certifiers employ a variety of standards 
(the global organic industry), the process of becoming familiar with individual standards 
can  also  increase  transaction  costs  substantially.  By  granting  accreditation  status,  an Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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accreditation agency acknowledges that the standards employed by a certification body, 
and hence exporters associated with that certifier, are equivalent to its own. This gives 
sellers  access  to  those  markets  for  which  the  accreditation  agency  has  jurisdiction. 
Without formal accreditation, buyers have to establish the equivalency of standards for 
individual certifiers, a process that increases transaction costs considerably (Lohr, 1998). 
An equivalency agreement is an agreement under which two or more nations agree 
that  each  other’s  national  standards  are  equivalent  for  the  purpose  of  trade.
2  Like 
accreditation, an equivalency agreement seeks to reduce the transaction costs associated 
with verifying that certification bodies’ standards are acceptable. The difference is that an 
equivalency agreement is between nations rather than between a certification body and an 
accreditation agency. 
 For an equivalency agreement to be effective, certification bodies operating in each 
nation  are  usually  required  to  obtain  accreditation  from  their  respective  national 
accreditation  agencies  (i.e.,  the  industry  is  regulated).  This  allows  the  equivalency 
agreement to provide access to the other nation’s market for all certified organic entities 
operating in each country. Equivalency agreements are preferable to accreditation because 
they  can  reduce  transaction  costs  and  fees  associated  with  obtaining  multiple 
accreditations. For example, an equivalency agreement between Canada and the European 
Union would provide market access for clients of Canadian certifiers to all member states 
in the EU, thus eliminating the need to obtain accreditation from each member state. 
Characteristics of the Existing 
Organic Regulatory System in Canada 
Organic certification and accreditation in Canada are currently voluntary. Organic sellers 
(including  producers)  need  not  obtain  certification  from  a  recognized  certifier,  and 
certifiers  need  not  obtain  accreditation  from  domestic  or  international  accreditation 
agencies. Canada does have a national organic standard, to which accreditation can be 
obtained through the Standards Council of Canada (SCC).
3 However, participation in the 
standard is extremely low. At present, only two of approximately forty certifiers have 
accreditation  under  Canada’s  national  standard:  Pro-Cert  Organics  and  the  Organic 
Producers Association of Manitoba (OPAM) (Standards Council of Canada, 2004).
4   
Many certification bodies have opted out of the national standard because of cost and 
the belief that national accreditation does not increase their market access. The federal 
government (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada) is trying to use the Canadian national 
standard  to  negotiate  equivalency  agreements  with  various  trading  partners,  but 
equivalency has yet to be established with any other country (COABC, 2005). 
Each of the forty Canadian certifiers has its own standard, to which producers and 
handlers  are  certified.  Many  of  these  certification  bodies  operate  on  a  regional  level, 
though several are national and even international in scale. Participants in organic markets 
typically become certified by the regional certification body they feel will provide the Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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greatest net benefit. Perceived advantages include lower annual fees, greater flexibility in 
terms of what constitutes “organic farming,” and greater access to foreign markets. 
Canada’s two primary organic export markets are the United States and the European 
Union.  To  obtain  access  to  U.S.  markets,  many  Canadian  certifiers  have  obtained 
accreditation under the recently introduced U.S. National Organic Program (NOP). The 
NOP requires all organic entities operating in or exporting to the United States to obtain 
certification from certifiers accredited to the American national organic standard (NOP, 
2005).  
There are two ways to gain access to EU organic markets. The first is obtaining status 
on the EU’s Third Country List, which is essentially an equivalency agreement between 
an  exporting  nation  and  the  broader  EU,  including  each  of  its  member  states.  By 
December 31, 2006, any country wanting to export organic products to Europe will have 
to obtain status on this list. The second option (used by most Canadian exporters) is to 
prove  on  a  case-by-case  basis  (through  accreditation)  that  products  are  produced 
according  to  procedures  deemed  to  be  equivalent  to  those  described  within  the  EU 
Organic Regulation. The fact that Canadian exporters use a variety of regional standards, 
however,  increases  the  aggregate  transaction  costs  of  this  verification  process 
considerably. This is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Problems with the Canadian Organic Regulatory System 
Despite the availability of certification and accreditation systems and the existence of a 
national standard, the current  mechanism for verifying organic  authenticity in Canada 
creates a variety of problems for industry stakeholders. These include high transaction 
costs for buyers and sellers in both domestic and foreign markets, high segregation costs, 
high accreditation fees for sellers, and an inability to protect domestic consumers against 
fraudulent organic claims. Each of these problems is discussed below. 
High Transaction Costs 
Sellers of  authentic organic products have  an incentive to obtain certification because 
buyers  can  reduce  their  own  transaction  costs  by  purchasing  only  certified  products. 
Further, accreditation allows buyers to see that standards are at a minimum acceptable 
level.  However,  low  participation  in  the  Canadian  national  standard  means  there  are 
essentially no minimum standards. Buyers cannot be certain that certified products are 
truly organic without having their respective accrediters evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
the standards and procedures employed by regional certifiers. The magnitude and detail of 
most organic standards can make this process difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.  
At first glance, the problem of maintaining market access to the EU seems as simple 
as negotiating equivalency (in other words, being placed on the Third Country List) using 
the Canadian national organic standard. However, the ability to negotiate an equivalency 
agreement with the EU hinges on the compliance of domestic certifiers with the Canadian Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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national  standard,  something  that  has  yet  to  be  widely  achieved  under  the  current 
voluntary  system.  Since  only  two  certification  bodies  are  currently  accredited  to  the 
national standard, an equivalency agreement with Europe will reduce transaction costs for 
EU  member  states  only  if  they  purchase  from  sellers  certified  by  one  of  those  two 
certifiers. If  EU buyers  want to purchase  from sellers associated  with other  Canadian 
certifiers, they will incur transaction costs associated with facilitating the evaluation, by 
their respective competent authority, of those certifiers’ standards and procedures. Here, 
the  efficacy  for  the  EU  is  questionable,  as  the  transaction  costs  saved  through  the 
equivalency agreement are likely to be less than the costs of developing the agreement 
itself. This is especially true when the voluntary nature of the Canadian standard means 
organic sellers in the EU already have access to Canadian markets.   
In short, an equivalency agreement between  Canada and the  EU today  would not 
improve  the  access  of  EU  exporters  into  Canada,  and  would  do  very  little  to  reduce 
transaction  costs  on  commodities  entering  Europe.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that 
Europe  has  recommended  that  Canada  invoke  more  complete  participation  in  the 
Canadian  standard  by  its  certifiers  prior  to  seeking  Third  Country  status  (Organic 
Regulatory Committee, 2003). 
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  to  acquire  market  access,  sellers  will  also  incur 
transaction costs associated with validating the integrity of their certification status as, all 
things being equal, foreign buyers will partake in an exchange only if they are able to 
assess certification status at a cost lower than that which they would incur in an equivalent 
alternative exchange. Barzel (1982) makes a similar argument by suggesting that high 
sorting and measurement costs reduce a buyer’s willingness to pay, creating an incentive 
for sellers to carry out these functions. Using oranges as an example, he suggests that 
sellers will incur sorting costs just up to the point that buyers themselves are dissuaded 
from  sorting.  Sorting  by  buyers  represents  an  increase  in  transaction  costs  and  can 
potentially  prevent  an  exchange  from  occurring.  In  the  case  of  the  organic  industry, 
verifying organic authenticity is like Barzel’s sorting. If  a seller is unwilling to incur 
transaction costs associated with this process, the buyer will seek a lower price or the 
transaction will not occur at all, as the buyer would then be inclined to purchase organic 
products  elsewhere.  The  fact  that  the  Canadian  organic  system  brings  about  high 
transaction costs for buyers with regard to assessing the equivalency of organic standards 
means that sellers must absorb a higher proportion of these costs than would sellers in 
countries where an efficient system is already in place. This situation places Canadian 
exporters at a disadvantage relative to exporters in nations where full participation in a 
minimum standard occurs. 
Protecting Domestic Consumers against Fraudulent Organic Claims 
Although  seldom  cited  as  an  inefficiency  in  the  Canadian  organic  certification/ 
accreditation system, the lack of a national standard and the lack of labeling requirements Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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(except in Quebec) make difficult the protection of domestic consumers against fraudulent 
organic claims. This is especially true given that Canada’s trading partners continue to 
develop and refine their own mandatory systems of organic standardization. The EU has 
had mandatory organic standards in place since 1991, while the United States introduced 
organic industry regulation in October 2002. This means that only high-quality organic 
products are allowed into these markets. Sellers of lower-quality organic products are 
therefore likely to look toward the Canadian market, as Canada is one of few organic 
markets  without  industry  regulation.  Canadian  consumers  still  have  the  option  of 
verifying  organic  authenticity through their  own  evaluation  of standards.  However,  in 
many  cases  they  may  be  completely  unfamiliar  with  certification/accreditation 
procedures. As long as Canadian consumers have difficulty authenticating the true nature 
of organic products, there is potential for the Canadian market to become infiltrated with 
products that cannot meet standards in markets outside of Canada. A situation like this is 
likely  to  increase  the  competition  faced  by  domestic  producers  of  authentic  organic 
products trying to market products locally as well as diminish consumer confidence in the 
availability of high quality products (thus eroding price premiums), and, in the long run, 
create a “market for lemons,” in much the same way as proposed by Akerlof (1970).  
High Accreditation Costs  
In  addition  to  increased  transaction  costs  for  buyers  and  sellers,  the  absence  of 
equivalency agreements between Canada and her trading partners has led to increased 
accreditation  costs  for  domestic  certifiers  and,  in  turn,  for  their  clients  (producers, 
processors, exporters, etc.). Without equivalency, certifiers often acquire market access 
for sellers by obtaining accreditation to individual agencies typically operating in separate 
countries. A certifier’s clients may sell products in a variety of countries; therefore, there 
is a need to obtain and maintain multiple accreditations. For example, Pro-cert Organic 
Systems, one of the largest certifiers in Western Canada, pays annual fees to maintain 
accreditation  status  with  four  accrediters  including  the  Standards  Council  of  Canada 
(SCC), the U.S. National Organic Program (NOP), the European Economic Community 
(EEC),  and  the  Conseil  d’accreditation  du  Quebec  (CAQ)  (Pro-cert  Organic  Systems 
Website, 2005). The total costs of these fees for many certifiers can be quite large, and 
may be passed down to the certifiers’ clients.  
If  equivalency  agreements  could  be  reached  with  Canada’s  trading  partners, 
certification  bodies  could  obtain  market  access  through  a  single  accreditation  to  a 
Canadian national standard. A recent study by IFOAM endorses this notion by suggesting 
that equivalency would greatly reduce accreditation requirements, and hence costs, as it 
would substantially reduce the number of accreditations required by exporters (IFOAM, 
2004b).  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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High Segregation Costs 
One  of  the  primary  costs  resulting  from  inefficiencies  in  the  Canadian  certification/ 
accreditation system results from the need to keep organic products isolated as they move 
along  the  supply  chain.  Under  the  current  system,  commodities  certified  by  different 
certification bodies must be kept separate because the standards may be different.  An 
inability to maintain segregation can ultimately prevent commodities from being marketed 
as  organic,  thus  resulting  in  a  loss  of  any  organic  premium.  The  Canadian  organic 
industry is heavily export-dependent, with almost 80 percent of commodities destined for 
the EU or the United States; hence, segregation and identity preservation costs can be 
quite high (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2002).   
Potential Solutions 
The problems described above result primarily from low participation in the Canadian 
national organic standard. In the case of foreign markets, if all organic certifiers operating 
in Canada participated in the national standard, the negotiation of equivalency agreements 
would be facilitated. This would reduce transaction costs for buyers and sellers in these 
markets, as well as accreditation and segregation costs for sellers. Similarly, the domestic 
market  would be protected because anyone selling in Canada  would be certified by a 
nationally accredited certifier. The next section of the article evaluates the potential to 
achieve these objectives through voluntary and mandatory systems.     
Can Voluntary Accreditation Work? 
Under the current voluntary system, it can be assumed that most certifiers avoid obtaining 
accreditation to the Canadian national organic standard because the costs of doing so 
outweigh  the  benefits.  The  government  (i.e.,  the  Standards  Council  of  Canada)  could 
decrease the cost/benefit ratio by lowering accreditation fees and obtaining equivalency 
agreements with Canada’s major trading partners. However, it is evident that without full 
participation by Canadian certifiers in the national standard, our trading partners have 
little incentive to negotiate equivalency agreements with Canada. This is especially true 
given  that  our  voluntary  standard  allows  free  access  into  Canadian  organic  markets, 
irrespective of equivalency. 
The Catch-22 situation described here might suggest that the most realistic solution to 
the problem is to make the Canadian national standard mandatory (an option that will be 
discussed in the next section); however, assume for a minute that the federal government 
could  negotiate  equivalency  agreements  and  reduce  accreditation  fees  despite  the  low 
participation. Would the voluntary standard then provide enough incentives to invoke full 
participation? The answer is no. Sellers in the Canadian organic industry participate in 
two different markets and therefore have two separate objective functions. For certifiers 
whose primary clients are exporters, the reduction in transaction costs, accreditation costs, 
and segregation costs derived from participating in the standard could be enough incentive Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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to obtain accreditation. The same cannot be said for certifiers whose clients participate 
only in Canadian markets. For these certifiers, accreditation to Canada’s national standard 
is still of little competitive advantage because it is not required to sell organic products in 
Canada. Many certifiers would still likely choose to bypass accreditation, and domestic 
consumers would still have no reliable way of verifying organic authenticity. The threat of 
substandard organic products infiltrating the marketplace would remain high, as would the 
potential emergence of the “market for lemons” alluded to earlier. Thus, in addition to 
current difficulties that the Canadian government is having with equivalency negotiations, 
it appears evident that although a voluntary system could potentially alleviate many of the 
problems experienced by Canadian exporters, it does little to protect domestic consumers.   
Mandatory Standards as a Solution 
Recognizing  the  shortcomings  of  a  voluntary  system  of  accreditation,  the  federal 
government is taking steps to introduce mandatory organic regulations in Canada. The 
defined national standard will effectively become the minimum acceptable benchmark for 
participants in the Canadian organic industry. Certifiers will still be free to add their own 
additional requirements for product differentiation strategies, but there will be a common 
minimum definition of what it means to be organic.   
These  characteristics  allow  mandatory  standards  to  succeed  in  two  key  areas  that 
voluntary regulations cannot: providing incentive, through reduced transaction costs, for 
trading partners to negotiate equivalency agreements, and preventing, through the threat 
of legal sanctions, the infiltration of poor-quality organic products into domestic markets. 
In  addition,  they  would  eliminate  the  further  proliferation  of  regional  standards,  thus 
reducing confusion among consumers about the true definition of “organic.” 
Conclusions and Further Research 
This article examines the notion of implementing a minimum mandatory national standard 
in the Canadian organic industry. Under the current voluntary system, buyers and sellers 
of  organic  commodities  experience  high  transaction  costs  associated  with  verifying 
organic authenticity, as well as high accreditation and segregation costs. In addition, the 
voluntary system does little to prevent the Canadian domestic market from becoming a 
“dumping ground” for low-quality organic products. These problems result primarily from 
low participation in the Canadian national organic standard.    
Low participation in the standard results from the fact that costs of accreditation are 
higher than the perceived benefits for certifiers and their clients. If the federal government 
were able to reach equivalency with Europe and the United States, it is likely that the 
perceived benefits for certifiers whose primary clients are exporters would outweigh the 
costs of accreditation. These clients would therefore have incentive to voluntarily seek 
accreditation to the national standard, which could significantly lower transaction costs 
otherwise faced by buyers and sellers in foreign markets.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  S. Weseen 
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It is unlikely that equivalency agreements alone would provide incentive to participate 
in  the  Canadian  national  standard  for  certifiers  whose  primary  clients  sell  in  Canada. 
Equivalency  agreements  are  not  required  for  access  to  Canadian  markets,  and  the 
“credence”  quality  of  organic  products  makes  it  difficult  and  costly  for  consumers  to 
verify organic authenticity. Over time, Canadian consumers could lose confidence in all 
organic  products  and  a  “market  for  lemons”  could  emerge.  A  mandatory  standard, 
however, could alleviate this problem, as it would require full participation of all certifiers 
operating or selling in Canada as well as abroad. 
It  should  be  noted  that  although  mandatory  regulation  of  the  Canadian  organic 
industry can potentially reduce transaction, accreditation, and certification costs, and can 
improve Canada’s ability to protect domestic consumers, the costs of implementing such a 
system are non-trivial. Therefore, future research in this area should focus on weighing 
the costs against the benefits of implementing and maintaining a mandatory system. Only 
then can the benefits of mandatory standards for the organic industry truly be assessed.  
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Endnotes 
1 Credence goods are goods for which it is impossible to authenticate quality through 
physical inspection or consumption. 
2 In some cases, an equivalency agreement could be between a nation (e.g., Canada) and a 
group of countries (e.g., the European Union). 
3 The SCC is the national standards association in Canada and provides accreditation for a 
wide range of voluntary standards. 
4 Estimates on this number vary widely, depending on whether provincial and regional 
affiliations with international certification bodies are counted. 
 